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I. INTRODUCTION
It has been a great many years since the United States has been
viewed as a pirate nation. Today, the United States seems to be the
number one finger pointer, but certainly not usually characterized as an
infringer itself. However, in the case of geographical indications, the
United States is out of step with international standards. In this article,
I argue that the United States has not yet fully implemented the _World
Trade Organization's (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights 1 (TRIPs or Agreement) provisions dealing

* Assistant Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law.
I would like to thank the Whittier Law School Center for Intellectual Property Law for
inviting me to participate in Whittier Law School's 17th Annual International Law
Symposium, and to the editors of Whittier Law Review for their helpful assistance in
editing my remarks. I must also disclose my involvement in Havana Club Holding,
SA. v. Galleon, SA., referred to in this article. 203 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 1999). I was
involved in representing the plaintiffs in that case. The analysis provided here is
entirely my own and does not represent the views of the plaintiffs or their counsel.
I. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (Apr. 15,
1994), Marrakesh General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade
Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade
Negotiations, Annex IC, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 [hereinafter Agreement]. "TRIPs
constitutes Annex 1C to the Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade
Organization of the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations of [April 15, 1994] (hereinafter WTO Agreement)."
73
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with geographical indications. In this regard, the United States is much
like other countries that are not in complete compliance with TRIPs
due to a lack of self-interest. But unlike other countries who may not
yet be in complete compliance with TRIPs because the various
intellectual property regimes may be new to them, the United States, I
argue, has failed to fully comply because of its distinct history and
theoretical perspective concerning geographical indications.

II. RATIONALE FOR THE PROTECTION OF GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS
It should not be surprising that the United States is not a major
proponent of the protection of geographical indications. 2 Countries
that stand to benefit the most from the protection of geographical
indications are those that have a long history of traditional industries,
such as many European countries. 3 These historical differences may
help explain the stance that the United States has taken with regard to
the protection of geographical indications, as compared to its stance
towards other intellectual property rights negotiated in TRIPs
Agreement. 4 At least in the case of trademarks, it is not overly
simplistic or inaccurate to say that the United States, with the exception
of protections of geographical indications, took a strongly proprotectionist, pro-property position in these negotiations. 5 That is, in
most cases it pushed for an expansion or ratcheting up of trademark
Robert M. Kunstadt & Gregor Buhler, 'Bud' Battle Jllustrates Peril of Geographic
Marks, 20 Natl. L.J. C3, n. 4 (May 18, 1998).
2. See e.g. Kunstadt & Buhler, supra n. I, at C3 ("[I]n the United States the
protection of geographic indications traditionally played a minor role.").
3. id. "Continental European countries such as France, Italy, Germany, and
Switzerland still provide a comprehensive system of protection for their domestic
geographic indications .... " id. Many "European countries ... have traditionally
protected geographical indications." Albrecht Conrad, The Protection of Geographical
indications in the TRIPs Agreement, 86 Trademark Rptr. 11, 12 (1996). However,
developing countries surprisingly have not had the same experience. Tuan N.
Samahon, TRIPs Copyright Dispute Settlement After the Transition and Moratorium:
Nonviolation and Situation Complaints Against Developing Countries, 31 L. & Policy
Intl. Bus. 1051, I 054 (2000).
4. Agreement, supra n. I, 33 l.L.M. at 1197-1225.
5. Michael Blackney, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A
Concise Guide to the TRIPS Agreement ( 1996); Agreement, supra n. 1, at 1203-05
(discussing the protection of trademarks); "[B]ut the United States-otherwise a
supporter of strong intellectual property rights protection-was not willing to go too far,
especially with regard to protection of wines and spirits." Kunstadt & Buhler, supra n.
1, at C3.
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rights. In contrast, the United States was resistant to adopt the
protections of geographical indications urged by some countries, such
as France in particular. 6
The inability of the U.S. to benefit to the same extent as European
countries, because of its apparent dearth of traditional industries, does
not fully explain U.S. resistance to the protection of geographical
indications. 7 Instead, I submit, the discord is of a more fundamental
nature having to do with the basic approach each continent takes to
trademark law. Since the earliest days in Europe, geographical
indications were used to protect certain industries. 8 As local
reputations grew for certain products, use of the place names became
attractive. To some extent such markings served as a warranty for the·
quality of the goods. To ensure the locale's reputation, the local
industry would agree to certain standards of production. The granting
of a right to use a geographical term associated with particular goods
exclusively to the producers within a certain region served to limit
competition, especially from producers outside that region. 9
This purpose is in contrast with the theory behind the prohibition
of uses of false indications of origin in the United States, under the

6. In fact, the United States' resistance to agree on this point held up all of the
WTO/GATT Agreements. W. Lee Webster, The Impact of NAFTA, GATT and TRIPs
Provisions on Trademark and Copyright Law 44 (PLI Pat., Copys., Trademarks, and
Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 04-3981, 1996).
7. See e.g. The Wine Institute <http://www.wineinstitute.org/communications/
statistics/keyfacts/worldwineproduction.htm> (accessed Oct. 17, 2000) (indicating that
Italy and France were, respectively, the top two wine producers in the world from 1995
to 1997 in terms of total gallons produced). For instance, in 1997, France was the
number one exporter of wine, a traditional industry that relies on geographical
indications. Id.; see Kunstadt & Buhler, supra n. 1, at C3 (discussing the historical use
of geographic indications for French wine, such as Champagne-the wine producing
region of France).
8. J. Thomas McCarthy & Veronica Colby Devitt, Protection of Geographical
Denominations: Domestic and International, 69 Trademark Rep. 199 (1979). Some
examples include "Roquefort" for cheese (see Community of Roquefort v. William
Faehndrich, Inc., 303 F.2d 494, 495-96 (2d Cir. 1962) (discussing the French
municipality of Roquefort's diligence in protecting its mark of "Roquefort Cheese," a
sheep's milk blue-mold cheese)), "Lipizzaner" for horses (see Lipizzaner Stallions
Dance Into Trade Brawl, N.Y. Times, Al (Mar. 11, 2000)), "Limoges" for China (see
In re Salem China Co., 157 U.S.P.Q. 600 (T.T.A.B. 1968)), and "Cognac" for liquer
(see Bureau Natl. lnterprofessionnel Du Cognac v. Intl. Better Drinks Corp., 6
U.S.P.Q.2d 1610 (T.T.A.B. 1988)).
9. Community of Roquefort, 303 F .2d at 496.
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Lanham Act. 10 In the U.S., such use is prohibited not to protect an
11
industry, but to protect the consumer against any resulting deception.
In the U.S., generally speaking, there are no rights in a term or sign
until that term or sign has become distinctive in the minds of the
relevant consumer as an indicator of source. 12 Thus, we are reluctant to
view these types of terms as conveying any kind of property rights in
and of themselves before they have been invested with meanmg
resulting from use in commerce. 13
The example of Budweiser beer illustrates these different
approaches. In the U.S., we recognize a property right in the term
"Budweiser" because it has been used in such a manner so as to have a
particular meaning for U.S. beer drinkers-as a source identifier. 14 The
term, however, was not free of meaning when the Anheuser-Busch
Company adopted it as a trademark. 15 In fact, "Budweiser" beer has
been brewed in Ceske Budejovice, Bohemia, known as "Budweis" in
10. Lanham Act,§§ 1-46 (codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994)). For ease of
reference, the sections of the Lanham Act are often referred to sequentially (§§ 1-46).
For the purposes of our inquiry, the footnoted citations to the Lanham Act will be to
the corresponding codification in title 15 of the United States Code sections 1051 et
seq.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Johnson, 116 F.2d 427 (2d
Cir. 1940) (Hand, J.) ("We are nearly sure to go astray in any phase of the whole
subject, as soon as we lose sight of the underlying principle that the wrong involved is
diverting trade from the first user by misleading customers who mean to deal with
him."); J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition vol. 1,
§§ 2:2, 2:33, 2-3, 2-57 (4th ed., West 2000).
12. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9-11 (2d Cir.
1976); J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition vol. 2,
§§ 16:1, 16:3, 16-3, 16-4 (4th ed., West 2000).
13. See e.g. Intl. Kennel Club of Chi., Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079 (7th
Cir. 1988); Co-Reef Prods., Inc. v. Marvy! Advertising Photo., Inc., 780 F.2d 1324,
1330 (8th Cir. 1985) (discussing that a user of a descriptive mark must show that the
mark has acquired a secondary meaning before the user can succeed on a claim of false
designation oforigin); see generally McCarthy, supra n. 12, §§ 16:1, 16:3, 16-3, 16-4
(discussing inherently distinctive marks and the acquisition of legal rights in a business
symbol).
14. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Budweiser Malt Prods. Corp., 295 F. 306 (2d Cir.
1923) (holding that American consumers came to associate the term "Budweiser" with
beer produced by the Anheuser-Busch company); see Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. DuBois
Brewing Co., 73 F. Supp. 338 (D. Pa. 1947).
15. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Assn. v. Fred Miller Brewing Co., 87 F. 864
(C.C.E.D. Wis. 1898); see also Kunstadt & Buhler, supra n. 1, at C3 (stating that
Budweiser was developed in Bohemia, which is the historic name for what is now the
Czech Republic).

HeinOnline -- 22 Whittier L. Rev. 76 2000-2001

2000]

GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS

77

German, for over 700 years. 16 Thus, the term "Budweiser" could have
been seen as a geographical indication that was deserving of protection
by reason of its association with beer production, and hence off limits
to beer not produced in that region. But as most U.S. beer drinkers did
not make this association at the time of its introduction, it was allowed
to be used in a manner that would invest it with a different rneaningthat of a brand of U.S. produced beer. 17
Drawing from this example, it is apparent that U.S. trademark law
is primarily concerned with the protection of consumers from the
confusing use of terms in branding. 18 Had U.S. beer drinkers been
aware of the town in Bohemia, and thought that it was desirable for
beer to originate in that town, Anheuser-Busch would likely not have
been free to appropriate that term for its brand. To do so would have
confused consumers as to the origin of its product. However, for a
country that is more concerned with protecting a traditional industry,
such as breweries, the analysis would not begin and end with the
consumer; but rather, would take into account the harm that might
befall that industry should its geographical name be freely appropriated
by outside competitors. This latter theory of protection encourages
those industries to maintain high standards of quality in order to benefit
from such a rights scheme. And when they do, they have the right to
prevent uses of the term that would diminish that local reputation.

III. THE TRIPS COMPROMISE
Corning from such different positions in terms of the benefits to
their domestic economies resulting from protection as well as
fundamentally different theories of protection, it is no surprise that
what was agreed to regarding geographical indications in the TRIPs
Agreement was a classic cornprornise. 19 Part II, Section 3 of TRIPs

16. Id. Czech beer is sold under the name "Budweiser" and has increasingly been
marketed in Western Europe "since the fall of the Iron Curtain." Id.
17. Id. (describing "Budweiser" as dominating the U.S. market).
18. 15 U.S.C. § l 125(a) (1994).
19. See Agreement, supra n. 1, 33 I.L.M. at 1198, 1205-1207 (discussing the
"[d]esire to establish a mutually supportive relationship between the [World Trade
Organization] and the World Intellectual Property Organization ... as well as other
relevant international organizations"); Kunstadt & Buhler, supra n. 1, at C3 (stating
that articles 22 through 24 ofTRIPs reflect the final compromise achieved with respect
to the protection of geographical indications).
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(articles 22-24) is devoted to geographical indications.2° This section
begins, in article 22, by defining geographical indications as:
[I]ndications which identify a good as originating in the territory
of a Member, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given
quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially
attributable to its geographical origin.2 1

The Agreement requires Members to provide the legal means to
"interested parties"22 to prevent the use of a geographical indication
that suggests that the good originates from a place other than its true
place of origin in a manner that is misleading. 23
Article 23 of TRIPs arguably provides stronger protection than
does article 22 for geographical indications used in connection with
wines and spirits. 24 Here, Members are required to provide interested
parties with the legal means to prevent the use of a geographical
indication for a wine or spirit not originating in the place indicated by
the geographical indication. 25 Unlike article 22, this article does not
require that the use of the geographical indication be misleading in
order to be actionable. 26 Furthermore, use of a false geographical
indication for wines and spirits will be prohibited even where the true
place of origin is indicated or where it is accompanied by terms such as
"kind," "type," or "style." 27 In short, a consumer's reaction to the use
of the geographical indication is irrelevant.
These rights, however, are seriously qualified by certain
exceptions that follow in article 24. 28 First, Members are not required
to forbid the continued and similar use of a false geographical
indication of another Member on wines and spirits by any of its
"nationals or domiciliaries," who have used the term continuously in
the Member territory either "for at least 10 years preceding 15 April

20. Agreement, supra n. 1, 33 l.L.M. at 1205.
21. Id. The TRlPs Agreement was the first international treaty to define
"geographical indication." See Agreement, supra n. 1, 33 l.L.M., art. 22, at 1205.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1205-06.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1205.
28. Id. at 1206-07. Article 24 reflects one of the most complex negotiations.
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1994" or "in good faith preceding that date."29 Second, Members may
not prejudice the eligibility of a trademark application submitted in
good faith, invalidate a trademark registered in good faith, or prejudice
rights to a mark acquired through use in good faith, where the mark
consists of a false geographical indication, and if such good faith use
commenced before the term was protected in the country of the place
indicated. 30 Third, Members are not required to prohibit the use of a
false geographical indication of a Member, where such term has
become generic within that territory, such as a grape varietal. 31
IV. PROTECTION OF GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS IN THE U.S.
As a result of TRIPs, the U.S. amended its law with regard to the
protection of geographical indications, but not nearly to the extent
required by the Agreement. 32 Prior to TRIPs, the Lanham Act
prohibited the registration of "deceptive" marks33 and marks that were
"primarily geographically descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive." 34
Additionally, a right of action existed against use of a mark that was
likely to cause confusion or to deceive. 35 Congress saw fit to amend
these provisions prior to TRIPs in order to implement the protections
for geographical indications contained in the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 36 Specifically, section 2(e) of the Lanham
Act, which prohibited the registration of terms that were primarily
geographically deceptively misdescriptive, was amended to include a

29. Id. at 1206. The key date indicated is the date of the Ministerial meeting
concluding the Uruguay Round, held in Marrakesh, Morocco, on April 15, 1994. Id. at
1125; World Trade Organization <http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/
ursum_e.htm> (accessed Sept. 17, 2000).
30. Agreement, supra n. l, 33 I.L.M. at 1206.
31. Id. at 1207.
32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (a) (1988).
34. 15 U.S.C. § I052(e) (1988).
35. See 15 U.S.C. § l l25(a) (discussing the right to bring a civil action against
another for using a false designation of origin or false descriptions).
36. 15 U.S.C. §§ l052(e), (f), l l25(a); North American Free Trade Agreement, 19
U.S.C. §§ 3301-3473 (1994). Prior to NAFTA, it was possible to overcome a section
2(e) finding by a showing of acquired secondary meaning. Co-Rect Prods., Inc. v.
Marvy! Advert. Photo., Inc., 780 F.2d 1324, 1330 (8th Cir. 1985). This exception was
removed in the amendments following NAFTA, unless secondary meaning was
acquired prior to December 8, 1993. 15 U.S.C. § l052(e), (f) (1994).

HeinOnline -- 22 Whittier L. Rev. 79 2000-2001

80

WHITTIER LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 22

grandfather clause for such terms that had become distinctive before
December 8, 1993. 37
After TRIPs, Congress made only one change to the Lanham Act
to implement the Agreement. 38 A clause was added to section 2(a)
specifically prohibiting the use of a geographical indication, which
when used in connection with wines or spirits, identifies a place other
than the origin of the goods. 39 This clause also contains a grandfather
clause, which allows such a use if it commenced before January 1,
1996. 40 Beyond that single amendment, Congress pronounced that the
activities of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF)
ensures compliance.
In fact, the BATF indirectly figures into U.S. compliance with
international protections for geographical indications by regulating the
labeling of alcoholic beverages in the U.S. 41 These regulations prohibit
false or misleading claims in the labeling or advertising of alcoholic
beverages, and require the prior approval of all labels used on alcoholic
beverages. 42 More specifically, since 1960, in an effort to determine
whether a geographic term is misleading, the BATF has categorized
geographical indications as generic, semi-generic, and non-generic. 43
Generic terms may be used freely and do not require the local origin to

37. 15 U.S.C. § I 052(e), (1) (Supp. V 1988). Another minor change was to separate
section 2( e) into two clauses: one forbidding the registration of a term that, when used,
is primarily geographically descriptive; and another forbidding terms that are primarily
geographically deceptively misdescriptive. Id. § 1052(e). See NAFTA Implementation
Act, Subtitle C-lntellectual Property Pub. L. No. 103-182, § 333, I 07 Stat. 2114
(signed into law and enacted Dec. 8, 1993).
38. Uruguay Round Agreements Act to implement GATT into United States law,
Pub. L. No. I 03-465, 108 Stat. 4809, Title V. 15 U.S.C. § I 052(a) (1994).
39. Id. Section 2 (a) prohibits, in pertinent part:
[Registration of marks which consist of or comprise] a geographical
indication which, when used on or in connection with wines or spirits,
identifies a place other than the origin of the goods and is first used on or in
connection with wines or spirits by the applicant [by January I, 1996].
Id.

40. Id.
41. 27 C.F.R. §§ 4.23, 4.4 (2000) (discussing the regulation of varietal labeling, its
corresponding exceptions, and the delegation of regulatory authority to the BATF).
42. Id. §§ 4.39, 4.50.
43. 27 C.F.R. § 4.24 (discussing examples of generic, semi-generic, and nongeneric terms with geographic significance).
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be indicated on the label. 44 In order to use semi-generic terms, the true
place of origin must be indicated. 45 Non-generic terms, on the other
hand, may be used only if the product originates in that place. 46
V. EVALUATION OF THE U.S. APPROACH

When comparing the protections afforded geographical
indications in TRIPs to the protections afforded geographical
indications in the U.S., it becomes apparent that there are significant
disparities. First, TRIPs permits Members to use a false geographical
indication only when such use was made in good faith. 47 However,
section 2(e) of the Lanham Act excuses use of a false geographical
indication simply on the condition that the mark acquired
distinctiveness before December 8, 1993.48 Thus, it apparently does
not discriminate between good and bad faith use. 49 Furthermore,
leaving good faith out of the equation, TRIPs only permits use of a
false geographical indication if used continuously prior to April 15,
1984. 50 The Lanham Act only requires use since 1993 under section
2(e), or 1996 in the case of wines or spirits under section 2(a). 51
Additionally, there is a potential difference between U.S. and
TRIPs standards concerning misleading geographical indications and
primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks. TRIPs
requires Members to prohibit use of a geographical indication that
"suggests" that the good originates in a place other than the true place
of origin in a manner that "misleads" the public. 52 Compare this
standard with section 2(e)(3) of the Lanham Act, which prohibits

44. id.; see Co-Rect Prods., inc. v. Marvy! Advert. Photo., inc., 780 F.2d 1324,
1329 ("A generic mark is one that refers to the common name or the nature of an
article, and most courts hold that it is not entitled to trademark protection.").
45. 27 C.F.R. § 4.24(b)(I).
46. id.§ 4.24(c)(I).
47. Agreement, supra n. I, 33 l.L.M. at 1206-07.
48. 15 u.s.c. § 1052(f) (1994).
49. Good faith in trademark law generally means that the mark was adopted
without knowledge of another's prior use of that mark. See LaTouraine Coffee Co. v.
Lorraine Coffee Co., 157 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1946). In the context of geographical
indications, bad faith entails some calculation to benefit from a locale's reputation. See
e.g., Am. Waltham Watch Co. v. U.S. Watch Co., 173 Mass. 85 (1899).
50. Agreement, supra n. 1, 33 l.L.M. at 1206.
51. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a), (f).
52. Agreement, supra n. I, 33 1.L.M. at 1205.
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registration of any mark, which when used in connection with the
goods in question, is "primarily geographically deceptively
misdescriptive of them .... " 53 The judicially created test for this
standard has two prongs: First, does the term primarily denote a
geographical place to reasonable consumers, and if so, do the goods in
fact come from that place?; Second, do consumers erroneously
associate the goods with that place?54 In other words, use of a false
geographical indication will only be actionable where U.S. consumers
are aware of the locale's reputation for the goods in question.
To illustrate the difference between the two standards, consider
the hypothetical use of "Bombay" in connection with watches not made
in Bombay.
Under the TRIPs standard, use of "Bombay" may tend to suggest
that the origin of the watches is Bombay, which may be misleading.
That is, since Bombay is not a generic term for watches, and since it
does not indicate a brand before it acquires secondary meaning,
reasonable consumers may think that the presence of the term indicates
the place of origin. Thus, under the TRIPs approach the use would be
enjoined. 55 However, under the U.S. approach, one would need to
determine whether consumers of watches in the U.S. would likely
perceive an association between watches and Bombay. 56 That is, if
Bombay is noted for its watch industry, or if reasonable consumers
would be motivated to purchase a watch, because they thought it came
from Bombay, then we may conclude that such an association exists.
Since neither happens to be the case, I am doubtful that a goods-place
association will be found, and the use would likely be permitted in the

U.S.
A third key difference is the standing requirements. 57 TRIPs
requires Members to provide the legal means to prevent the use of a
false geographical indication to all "interested parties." 58 In contrast,
U.S. trademark law only grants standing to persons who are "likely to

53. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(3).
54. In re Loew 's Theatres, Inc., 769 F.2d 764, 764 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
55. See Agreement, supra n. I, 33 I.L.M. at 1215 (discussing the judicial authority
"to order a party to desist from an infringement").
56. Jn re Loew 's Theatres, Inc., 769 F.2d at 764.
57. 15 U.S.C. § I 125(a) {1997); Agreement, supra n. I, 33 I.L.M. at 1205.
58. Agreement, supra n. I, 33 l.L.M. at 1205.
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be damaged." 59 This standard has been judicially defined as "the
potential for a commercial or competitive injury" in the U.S. 60 This
potential injury will not be presumed, but must be demonstrated, and
the plaintiff must be able to show a causal nexus between such harm
and defendant's actions. 61 Although "interested parties" are not
defined in TRIPs, an interested party may be understood as a
competitor, or as one who produces the goods in question in the place
indicated by the geographical indication.
U.S. trademark law,
however, is far more exacting. In the U.S., courts have "limited
standing to assert a section 43 [of the Lanham Act] claim to a 'purely
commercial class' of plaintiffs," or otherwise stated, to those engaged
in commerce. 62
Another important difference is that TRIPs mandates the
prohibition of the registration and use of false geographical
indications. 63 Significantly, the Lanham Act only prohibits the
registration of such terms. 64 No provision was added in the TRIPs
implementing legislation for "interested parties" to prevent the use of a
false geographical indication. 65 The only avenue of redress available is
a claim under section 43(a) for a person who is "likely to be damaged"
by the use of a term that is "likely to cause confusion, or to cause
. ke, or to dece1ve
. .... ,,66
mista
When comparing TRIPs to the BATF standards, an obvious
difference is the BATF's creation of the "semi-generic" category. 67
TRIPs, of course, prohibits false geographical indications used in
connection with wines or spirits, even where the true origin of the

59. 15 U.S.C. § l 125(a).
60. Berni v. Intl. Gourmet Restaurants of Am., Inc., 838 F.2d 642, 648 (2d Cir.
1988) (citing J. Gilson, Trademark Protection and Practice vol. 1, § 7.02[3], 7-25
(1987)).
61. Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Cosprophar, Inc., 32 F .3d 690, 694 (2d Cir. 1994).
62. Berni, 838 F.2d at 648 (citing Colligan v. Activities Club of N. Y., Ltd., 442 F .2d
686, 692 (2d Cir. 1971)).
63. Agreement, supra n. 1, 33 l.L.M. at 1205 (emphasis added).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1994) (emphasis added).
65. Id.
66. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1997). Sections 2(a) and 2(e) both deal with the
registration of marks. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(a) & (e).
67. See 27 C.F.R. § 4.24 (2000) ("A name of geographic significance, which is also
the designation of a class or type of wine, shall be deemed to have become semigeneric only if so found by the appropriate ATF officer.").
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goods is indicated. 68 Additionally, under TRIPs, there is an exception
where the term has become generic, but there is no exception for terms
that have become semi-generic. 69 Article 24 of TRIPs states in part:
Nothing in this Section shall require a Member to apply its
provisions in respect of a geographical indication of any other
Member with respect to goods or services for which the relevant
indication is identical with the term customary in common
language as the common name for such goods or services in the
territory of that Member. Nothing in this Section shall require a
Member to apply its provisions in respect of a geographical
indication of any other Member with respect to products of the
vine for which the relevant indication is identical with the
customary name of a grape variety existing in the territory of that
Member as of the date of entry into force of the WTO
Agreement. 70

The term "semi-generic" is in fact new to the trademark lexicon. The
only guidance we are given as to what the term "semi-generic" could
possibly mean is through the examples provided by the BATF, which
include: Burgundy; Claret; Chablis; Champagne; Chianti; and
Sauteme. 71
VI. CASE IN POINT

In order to demonstrate the gaps in protection under U.S. law, this
article will analyze a recent dispute from the U.S. federal courts
involving a foreign geographical indication. The case is Havana Club
Holding, SA. v. Galleon SA. 72 It involves the mark "Havana Club" for
rum. 73 At issue, was whether rum that was not produced in Havana
could be labeled with the "Havana Club" name. 74 Plaintiffs, Havana
Club Holding et al., a fifty-percent Cuban, fifty-percent French joint
venture, 75 produced rum in Cuba under the mark "Havana Club."76

68.
69.
70.
71.

72.
73.
74.
75.

Agreement, supra n. I, 33 l.L.M. at 1205-06.
Id. at 1206-07.
Id. at 1207.
27 C.F.R. at§ 4.24(b)(2).
Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon S.A .. 203 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 1999).
Id. at 119.
Id. at 119-21.
Id. at 120.
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However, the plaintiffs were legally prohibited from selling their
Havana rum in the U.S. because of the existing U.S. embargo against
Cuba. 77 The defendants, Bacardi Corporation et al., wanted to establish
rights to sell rum in the U.S. under the same mark, "Havana Club."78
Again, because of the embargo against Cuba, the defendants were
legally prohibited from selling in the U.S. a rum produced in Cuba. 79
This case may appear straightforward under TRIPs. "Havana
Club" for rum would likely be considered a geographical indication in
that Cuba is a place well known and ·regarded for its rum production. 80
Further, the plaintiffs would likely be considered "interested parties,"
being the producer of the goods in the place indicated by the
geographical indication. 81 Under article 22 of TRIPs, use of "Havana
Club" on rum would tend to suggest that the rum came from Havana
and would likely mislead consumers. 82 Moreover, because a spirit is
concerned, article 23 is applicable. Under article 23, regardless of
whether the mark "Havana Club" would mislead consumers,
defendants' use would be actionable because defendants' rum was
simply not from Cuba. 83 Additionally, defendants do not qualify for
any exception, as they did not begin to use the mark until 1995. 84
Furthermore, the defendants' use of the mark was not in good faith as
they knew of the plaintiffs' production of rum under the "Havana
Club" label and the significance of that label in the rum market. 85
76. Id. at 119-2 l.
77. Id. at 121; see 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.101-515.901 (2000) (discussing U.S. control
regulations of Cuban assets and the prohibitions on U.S. and Cuban trade).
78. Havana Club Holding, 203 F.3d at 119-21.
79. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.101-515.901 (2000).
80. See generally Tom Gibbs & Charlotte Denny, WTO Referees Rum Punch-up:
News Analysis Cuban Refinery Takes on Bacardi in Latest Bout of Transatlantic Trade
War, Guardian (July 18, 2000) (available in 2000 WL 24263373) (stating that Havana
Club rum was produced and made famous in the Cuban town of Santa Cruz de! Norte,
in the decades before Fidel Castro's revolution).
81. Havana Club Holding, S.A., 203 F.3d at 119-21. In fact, plaintiffs exported rum
using the "Havana Club" trademark under an exclusive license. Id. at 121.
Furthermore, the plaintiffs and defendants are fierce competitors, with the defendants
being the world's largest rum producer. See e.g. White Spirit, Dark Dealings as Rum
Trade War Flares, Sunday Express (June 4, 2000) (available in 2000 WL 9219582).
82. Agreement, supra n. 1, 33 l.L.M. at 1205.
83. Havana Club Holding, S.A., 203 F.3d at 122; Agreement, supra n. 1, 33 l.L.M.
at 1205-06.
84. Havana Club Holding, S.A., 203 F.3d at 121.
85. Gibbs & Denny, supra n. 80.
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Thus, under TRIPs, defendants' use of the mark "Havana Club" should
be prohibited.
The case was not tried under TRIPs, but under U.S. law. 86 The
hypothetical analysis of the issues under TRIPs differs markedly from
how the issues were actually analyzed by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals. 87 First, and most significantly, the court held that the
plaintiffs lacked standing. 88 The plaintiffs were forced to sue under
section 43(a) because this was a case in which the use of a false
geographical indication was at issue, as opposed to its registration. 89
However, the plaintiffs were not commercially damaged in the United
States by the defendants' actions, because the embargo legally
prohibited the plaintiffs from selling their rum in the United States. 90
That is, the defendants' wrongful conduct could not possibly cause the
plaintiffs to lose a single sale in the U.S. 91 The argument that they
would be irreparably damaged when the embargo is lifted was rejected
on the grounds that the damage was too speculative, since it is not
certain when, if ever, the forty-year-old embargo will cease. 92
The embargo may have posed additional problems for plaintiffs
had they survived the standing requirement. Query whether plaintiffs
would have been able to provide proof of the requisite confusion under
the standard of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act? 93 Under section
86. Havana Club Holding, S.A., 203 F.3d at 122-35. TRIPs is not self-executing in
the United States, and requires legislation to implement TRIPs provisions. See

Uruguay Round Agreements Act to Implement GATT into United States law, Public
Law I 03-465, 108 Stat. 4809, Title V; see also Agreement, supra n. 1, 33 I.L.M. at
1198 ("Members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the
provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system and practice."). Thus, there
is no cause of action directly under TRJPs in U.S. courts. Id.
87. Havana Club Holding, S.A., 203 F.3d at 116-35.
88. Id. at 119, 122.
89. 15 U.S.C. § l 125(a) (1994); Havana Club Holding, S.A., 203 F.3d at 121
(emphasis added).
90. Hanava Club Holding, S.A., 203 F.3d at 122.
91. Id. The standing requirement under U.S. law underscores my point about the
operative theory underlying the protection of geographical indications. It is difficult
for a good to have acquired a distinctive mark in the minds of U.S. consumers where
the good has yet to be sold in the United States. Moreover, if the theory underlying
protection was to safeguard traditional industries, standing would certainly be
conferred in cases where the complainant is the single producer of the product in
question from that locale.
92. Id.
93. 15 U.S.C. § l 125(a).
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43(a), the plaintiffs would have to prove that consumers would likely
be confused into believing that the defendants' rum was from Cuba; 94
unlike section 2(e)(3), where the plaintiffs could certainly make a
showing of a goods-place association between rum and Cuba. 95
Moreover, as rum from Cuba has been legally prevented from
appearing on liquor store shelves for the past forty years, one can
imagine a scenario in which the defendants could make a showing that
U.S. consumers seeing a rum product for sale in the U.S. marked
"Havana Club," would know that it could not possibly be from Cuba. 96
VIL CONCLUSION
The Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon S.A. case is merely the
most recent illustration of the disconnect between the United States'
rationale for protecting geographical indications, and the rationale that
other countries have for this type of protection. The Scotch Whisky
Association has filed numerous and unsuccessful cases in U.S. courts
in attempts to prevent the use of words and symbols that it believed
suggested Scotland as the place of origin for many Whiskeys. 97
Likewise, the French organization dedicated to the protection of French
geographical indications, L'Institut National des Appellations
d'Origine (INAO), has also filed suit in a U.S. court attempting to
prevent the use of a false French geographical indication. 98 The Cuban
case presents, or at least should have presented, in the clearest manner
the different approaches and rationales for protecting geographical

94. Id.
95. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(e)(3), (f), l 125(a).
96. Bacardi made precisely this argument in another, unrelated case. See In re
Bacardi & Co. Ltd., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d 1031 (T.T.A.B. 1997). See Havana Club Holding,
S.A., 203 F.3d at 120 (discussing the Cuban embargo). In fact, the evidence in the case
went against such a showing. In a consumer survey admitted by plaintiffs testing rum
consumers' knowledge of the embargo, thirty-three percent of consumers surveyed
thought it was legal to sell rum from Cuba in the U.S., and nine percent did not know
whether it was legal or illegal. Id. at 131.
97. Scotch Whisky Assoc. v. Majestic Distilling Co., 958 F.2d 594 (4th Cir. 1992);
Scotch Whisky Assoc. v. U.S. Distilled Prods. Co., 952 F.2d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 1991);
Scotch Whisky Assoc. v. Consol. Distilled Prods., Inc., 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14891
(N.D. Ill. May 7, 1981).
98. lnstitut Nat. Des Appellations D'Origine v. Vintners Intl. Co., 958 F.2d 1574,
1575 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (opposing Vintners International Company's registration of the
trademark "CHABLIS WITH A TWIST" for "a citrus flavored wine").
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indications. 99 The anomaly of the forty-year Cuban embargo has
provided a case in which the place indicated-Havana-is unarguably
known for the production of the goods in question-rum. However, at
the same time, there may be a problem in proving consumer confusion.
In addition, there is the irony of a Cuban company coming to a U.S.
court arguing on behalf of the U.S. consumer.

99. Havana Club Holding, S.A., 203 F.3d at 116-35.

HeinOnline -- 22 Whittier L. Rev. 88 2000-2001

